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Prisons, the Profit Motive and Other Challenges to Accountability 
 
 
It has been argued that “accountability is the linchpin of the correctional system” 
(Freiberg, 1999, p 120) and needs to be a central feature of any prison system. It is 
here that care needs to be taken. Accountability in its modern manifestation has 
become a largely technical and instrumental process, yet accountability for prison 
policies and practices has an undeniable moral component that needs to be 
addressed in order for public accountability to be meaningful within this domain. 
In Australia, accountability for private prisons has emphasised performance 
measures, contractual compliance and monitoring, and this has often led to poor 
outcomes for prisoners and the Australian community more broadly. The rise of 
the modern private prison brings new questions surrounding appropriate 
approaches to accountability, some of which will be explored in this paper. In 
order to consider the affect of private prisons on the Australian prison system, I 





Prisons, the Profit Motive and Other Challenges to Accountability 
 
 
Prisons mean business. 
 
They are large organisations. They consist of many paid staff, bricks and mortar, 
beds, security devices, professional practitioners of ancillary services. They are 
expensive to build. They are expensive to operate. 
 
But they are easy to fill (White, 1999, p. 243). 
 
 
Dostoevsky argued that a society should be judged not by how it treats its outstanding 
citizens, but by how it treats its criminals. If Dostoevsky is right, and we are to judge 
society on this basis, information must be made publicly available in order to form a 
picture of our treatment of citizens we deem to be criminals1. This picture is essential to 
ensure that governments, acting on behalf of society, are held accountable for decisions 
regarding the treatment of criminals and responses to criminal behaviour. The exchange of 
information becomes even more important when that information pertains to the closed and 
isolated environment of the prison. However, information in and of itself is not enough. We 
need a context in which to place that information and a framework in which to understand 
and debate the issues surrounding a society’s decision to imprison some of its members. In 
this paper I argue that public accountability is central to a democratic government’s ability 
to exercise its powers of restraint and punishment.  A technical or instrumental discharge of 
such a responsibility is not enough, as the vulnerability of those incarcerated and the 
invisibility of those who manage that incarceration, inscribe a moral dimension to the 
accountability relationships that result.  
 
The rise of the private prison, has added to the public accountability issues within the 
prison sector. Although businesses have been involved in the administration of punishment 
throughout history, the shift to state administered punishment was heralded as a way to 
ensure equity, justice and humanity within the penal system (Morris and Rothman, 1995)2. 
Over the last twenty years this has changed significantly with the emergence of a 
contemporary, private, ‘for-profit’ prison industry, providing diverse services, including 





juveniles, people on remand, illegal immigrants, and adult offenders. This contemporary 
transference of responsibility for prisons, from the public to the private sector, began in the 
United States twenty years ago and is now commonplace in Britain and Australia, with the 
latter holding about 17.8% of its incarcerated population in privately owned and/or 
operated prisons3 (Private Prison Report International May 2003; Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2004; Roth, 2004). This transformation has also signified changes in 
accountability relationships between the community, the government and the private prison 
operator that are only beginning to be investigated. 
 
This paper will consider some of these issues, paying particular attention to the 
privatisation of prisons in Australia, but first it is important to consider what I mean by 
accountability within this work.  
 
Accountability: Its Technical and Moral Dimensions 
 
Accountability is notoriously difficult to define (Cousins & Sikka, 1993; Sinclair, 1995). 
Although few would argue against the proposition that accountability involves the giving 
and/or receiving of an account of an event (Mulgan, 2000), there are many who argue that 
this is not all that it entails (Sinclair, 1995; Shearer, 2002). Even though many accounting 
researchers are recognising that accountability has broader, more nebulous implications 
and possibilities, the more commonplace expectations do play an important role. The 
giving and receiving of accounts of events for which we have an interest or a responsibility 
has a number of important features; the account must be offered to an external source; it 
enables debate as the giving or receiving of an account should allow for clarification, 
scrutiny and revision; and it reinforces the idea that a broader social group may have rights 
to an account of an event for which they are not directly in control (Mulgan, 2000).  
 
One of the problems associated with this interpretation of accountability is that in order to 
discharge the requirement to be accountable, both the private and public sector have come 
to rely heavily on approaches that are technical, measurable and procedural - which may 
have the effect of limiting our expectations of what a public or private enterprise should be 
accountable for (Nelson, 1993; Shearer, 2002). Nelson (1993) has argued that the technical 
emphasis that has come to dominate our understanding of accountability, particularly 





ethical influences and dimensions. These are evidenced by the increasing reliance on 
performance measures (Robinson, 2003), financial reports (Stanton, 1997), limited audit 
investigations (English, 2003) and political debate that centres on a statistical or numerical 
discussion of events (Rose, 1991). In regard to accounting, Arrington has argued that 
“accounting just assumes its sovereignty over the moral, assumes its right to hold all 
accountable to its ridiculous telos – money” (1999, p.1). Dillard and Ruchala (2005) have 
taken this argument further, raising the idea that a technical or hierarchical approach to 
accountability has enabled “administrative evil” in which a social actor is disconnected 
from the moral community through technical processes. They claim that  
 
 (o)vercoming administrative evil can occur only as a reconnection of the 
instrumental and the moral is undertaken through a reintegration of socializing and 
hierarchical accountability systems (Dillard and Ruchala, 2005, p.619). 
 
So, although accountability has often been interpreted to be a largely procedural and 
technical exchange of information between interested parties that fulfils a broader social, 
political and economic need within societies that make claims to democracy - increasingly, 
accountability is being recognised as a discourse (Nelson, 1993; Sinclair, 1995). Discourses 
of accountability play a role in constituting our beliefs about who, what and how accounts 
of events are to be given and received (Roberts, 1991). It is constantly being renegotiated 
(often unequally) and it always encompasses the possibility of challenge (Roberts, 1991). 
The paper represents a contribution to the challenges that are already emerging within the 
accounting literature to the dominance of technical and procedural dimensions of 
accountability over its important moral and ethical implications (Broadbent, Dietrich and 
Laughlin, 1996; Shearer, 2002; Funnell, 2003; Dillard and Ruchala, 2005). Shearer (2002), 
in particular, emphasises the need to redefine accountability beyond the narrow 
requirements of economic entities within market economies. She says that it is “moral 
responsibility that grounds the accountability of the entity with respect to this community” 
(2002, p.543) and she called for 
 
(a) discourse of human identity that is irreducibly distinct from economic man, and 
it must be capable of infusing our self-understanding as economic subjects with a 






Shearer’s (2002) call for a deeper appreciation of who we are as ethical (as well as 
economic) beings is indicative of a growing interest in an expanded understanding of what 
constitutes accountability. It also suggests ways that we can avoid being trapped by an 
already present discourse that emphasises accountability in limited, often economic, terms 
and is supported by Lehman’s (2005, pg. 976) call for a framework that “contextualised 
accountability within a substantive moral framework”. This is particularly important within 
the context of public accountability for privately operated prisons, as ethics and morality 
should not be divorced from debates about incarceration and the management of such 
facilities. 
 
The discussion that follows seeks to expose how the Australian government has come to 
define public accountability for private prisons in limited terms, focusing largely on cost 
effectiveness rather than service quality. This approach has also emphasised specific 
performance requirements; it has disengaged debate from the purpose and intent of 
incarceration; and broader issues of accountability that link a community of citizens to its 
responses to criminal behaviour have all but disappeared. This is the real purpose of public 
accountability and the provision of information that narrows this scope to such things as the 
number of drug tests, or the number of violent incidents within a prison distracts us from 
examining the deeper issues that arise from a social choice to incarcerate criminals – 
particularly within the confines of privately operated, profit oriented, prisons. Within the 
current political climate, the discharge of this responsibility has emphasised the technical 
and procedural dimensions of accountability. However, even this has been hard to achieve. 
As will be shown, this effaces the significant moral and ethical aspects of the 
accountability relationships between the private operator and the government; the 
government and citizens and ultimately, our society and how it treats people we deem to be 
‘criminal’. 
 
Pushing Prison Privatisation 
 
In state capitalist democracies, the public arena has been extended and enriched by 
long and bitter popular struggle. Meanwhile concentrated private power has 
labored to restrict it. The conflicts form a good part of modern history. The most 





arena to unaccountable institutions: kings and princes, priestly castes, military 
juntas, party dictatorships, or modern corporations (Chomsky, 1999, p.132). 
 
Generally, it has been argued that outsourcing and privatisation have benefits that include 
the ability for the government to shop around for vendors in order to choose the quality and 
quantity of services required. It has also been suggested that outsourcing will invite 
competition, giving the government choices between innovative, lean, less expensive 
service providers (Dixon et al, 1996; Shaoul, 1997; Taylor & Warrack, 1998). There are a 
number of corresponding concerns, including the fact that competition may not be easily 
stimulated or may not suit the industry in question (for example, defence industry 
contractors are highly specialised and secretive, two qualities that do not suit a competitive 
market; and in Australia there had been three companies bidding for private prison 
contracts in the early stages of privatisation); there have also been many examples of bad 
contracts (Funnell, 2001)4; there is a danger of excessive dependence on a particular 
service provider; and perhaps most importantly, the full costs of the process are rarely 
calculated (for example, the cost to the community of eroding job security; the retraction of 
state obligations to its citizens; and the cost of reversing the decision if it turns out to be a 
bad one) (Gormley, 1991; Butler, 1991). Although couched in neoliberal terms, the case for 
private prison cost-effectiveness remains ambiguous and evidence from innumerable 
studies have revealed contradictory outcomes (Logan, 1990; McDonald, 1990; Kirby et al, 
2000; Cooper and Williams, 2005). Most recently NSW Parliament’s inquiry into the 
‘Value for Money for NSW Correctional Centres’ (2005) found that no definitive 
conclusion could be drawn on the cost-effectiveness of private prisons because the 
uniqueness of each prison (such as size, mixture of prisoners, responsibility, programs, 
building design, services) doesn’t enable a meaningful comparison.  
 
The lack of definitive information about outsourcing decisions would suggest that it cannot 
be separated from ideological, political, economic or ethical influences (Ryan & Ward, 
1989; Chomsky, 1999). Cooper and Williams (2005) argued financial representations of 
cost savings used to initiate discussions about prison privatization, are in and of themselves 
hypothetical. This hypothetical data has been used as though it is ‘real’ in order to 
legitimise the privatisation agenda and when the assumptions that underpinned the data 
were explored it became obvious that many alternative conclusions could be drawn. For 





treated the current Scottish incarceration trends as “inexorable and failed to consider 
alternatives to custody” (Cooper and Williams, 2005, p.499).  
 
Incarceration has a variety of different public policy objectives and justifications (such as 
deterrence, reform, incapacitation and/or classification) and imprisonment also has 
unintended consequences and effects a person in more ways than those anticipated by the 
State. Amongst other things, it means that a member of society is restrained and loses their 
freedom; their life path is interrupted; their family and social relations become difficult to 
maintain; there is a reduction in civil liberties such as privacy; they are held in places that 
are frequently charged with an atmosphere of distrust and violence; they are often 
surrounded by drugs and drug deals; and their lives often become lonely, idle and 
unstimulated. In this vein Davis argued that the “prison industrial system materially and 
morally impoverishes its inhabitants and devours the social wealth needed to address the 
very problems that have led to spiralling numbers of prisoners” (1998). This places an 
inescapable moral responsibility on society to ensure that there are clear objectives 
associated with incarceration; that imprisonment meets these broader social objectives; and 
that prisons operate in a socially acceptable manner. Fundamentally, a society holds a 
‘criminal’ accountable for their actions and that person has a corresponding right to an 
accountable execution of the objectives of their sentence. This is predicated on the 
assumption that all of these can be negotiated meaningfully and democratically. It is also 
complicated by the fact that some private entities can now profit from incarceration and 
that these entities have a vested interest in the maintenance, if not the expansion of 
incarceration as a response to criminal behaviour. It has led some to ask whether there are 
“services that are “inherently governmental” and should thus be quarantined from the 
process [of contracting out]?” (Schoombee, 1997, p.141). This has raised discussion about 
how to reconfigure accountability within this context (Funnell, 2003; Dillard and Ruchala, 
2005) 
 
Not only are the public policy objectives diverse, but also the level of privatisation vary 
considerably. As many peripheral services that are integral to the operation of a public 
prison are now purchased from private contactors, including employment advice/training, 
garbage collection, energy and water/sewerage services, boundaries between the public and 
the private sector are blurred. This complicates accountability arrangements and makes it 





situation that has been capitalised on by private operators who argue they are just providing 
cheaper services, whilst distancing themselves from the significance of those services to 
the community. This is a point presented by many scholars in the field, such as Harding 
who has argued that 
 
(t)he key point, whatever degree or model of privatisation is adopted, is that the 
allocation of punishment should remain with the state apparatus, whilst the day to 
day administration of that punishment is devolved to the contract managers (1992, 
p.2). 
 
Harding’s (1992) point of view would suggest that a clear distinction between sentencing 
and the administration of that sentence could be drawn. Such a distinction is not necessarily 
as easy or as desirable as this suggests. As the State has the power to deprive a person of 
their liberty, it is critical the administration of that sentence is subject to an appropriate 
standard of care, that human rights are observed and the actions of those vested with the 
control over the detainees should be closely scrutinised and monitored. The further this task 
moves away from the State the more difficult it is to monitor and the State has more 
opportunity to retreat from its responsibility to ensure such conditions. Moyle has argued 
“(i)t should be emphasised that prison regimes, and the powers exercised by those who 
manage them, involve a continuation of sovereign power” (1999, p.154) and that there is a 
need to identify the “the powers that may not be delegatable within a democracy” (1999. 
p.155).  
 
The delegation of these powers may well be strategic, providing benefits to both  the state 
and the private sector. Chomsky (1996; 1999) has argued that the current capitalist order 
undermines democracy, and within this context public debate has diminished. This is a 
view that is supported by Munck (2005, p.65) when he wrote that it “is government 
intervention in economic life that threatens freedom, according to the neoliberal theorists”. 
As corporations gain control of more and more of the institutions and services traditionally 
maintained by government (such as prisons), private power has been enhanced. As such, 
formal electoral democracy helps to maintain the illusion of democracy, and that the 
“population has been diverted from the information and public forums necessary for 







(n)eoliberalism5 is the defining political economic paradigm of our time – it refers to 
the policies and processes whereby a relative handful of private interests are permitted 
to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximise their personal profit 
(McChesney,1998, p. 7). 
 
This has often been characterized as a logical and appropriate response to governments 
who have been painted as “incompetent, bureaucratic and parasitic” (McChesney, 1998, 
p.7). On the other hand the free market is assumed to “encourage private enterprise and 
consumer choice, reward personal responsibility and entrepreneurial initiative” 
(McChesney, 1998, p.7) even though there is little empirical evidence to support this claim. 
Contrary to the rhetoric of neoliberalism, Chomsky (1999) points out that governments 
have not reduced in size, and there is little evidence to suggest that privatised public assets 
have increased in efficiency and/or quality. The ideology that underpins neoliberalism has 
contributed to the rise of private prisons, and with this privatisation a number of questions 
need to be raised about the nature, appropriateness and maintenance of public 
accountability within a prison system that is increasingly profit oriented.  
 
Investigations such as this one, need to be placed within the context of neoliberalism, in 
order to shed light on the ways that we organise our societies and to problematise the 
privatisation of prisons on both technical and moral grounds (see Russell, 1997). This 
argument hinges on the idea that ‘neoliberal’ governments serve the interests of capital and 
its impulse to continually accumulate, whilst enabling a retreat from any substantive public 
accountability.. As Puxty (1997) has argued, when capitalism is in crisis, capital needs to 
expand into new areas, which may lead to a changed role of the state as it releases areas it 
has traditionally controlled to the private sector and “capitalism tries to turn all 
relationships into a commercial exchange” (Hutton and Giddens, 2001, p.17). In this vein, 
private prisons serve both the interests of government and private enterprise. Private 
prisons may help disguise the impact of global capitalism on people (through job losses, 
failure to provide productive work and ‘imprisoning’ the products of political and 
economic alienation), it appears to shift the responsibility for prisons to the private sector 
and it enables private interests to profit in a new way. As a result it diminishes the public 
sphere, and changes the nature of public accountability (Chomsky, 1999; Funnell, 2003). In 






(d)emocracy is under attack worldwide, including the leading industrial countries; at 
least, democracy in a meaningful sense of the term, involving opportunities for 
people to manage their own collective and individual affairs. Something similar is 
true of markets. The assaults on democracy and markets are furthermore related. 
Their roots lie in the power of corporate entities that are increasingly interlinked and 
reliant on powerful states, and largely unaccountable to the public (1999, p.92). 
 
The changing relationships between the private and the public sector referred to by 
Chomsky (1999) have impacted significantly on discourses of accountability. The current 
arrangements for incarceration in Australia testify to this. It is now possible that a private, 
for profit, company to be accountable to the government for the delivery of prison services 
and facilities and the government is then accountable to the public (including prisoners) for 
the delivery of these services – in so doing, distance is placed between the service provider 
and the community in a way that would present significant challenges to fulfilling any 
technical, let alone moral, accountability function. In an attempt to address this, or further 
reinforce it, private prison operators present largely technical accounts of events and are 
accountable for the delivery of certain services at a certain quality against performance 
indicators (Robinson, 2003); the government is able to report on these in a relatively 
objective manner and also distance themselves from direct responsibility; and at the same 
time, questions about the ethical and moral responsibility of government and society to 
these citizens is almost entirely eradicated from debate. 
 
Before proceeding, it is important to note that there is a problem with framing the debate 
within the private/public sector dichotomy, and considering accountability issues within 
this framework, as it can often fail to investigate the ‘subject’ that is being debated (Cooper 
and Williams, 2005). This is in itself an emasculated view of accountability, because it 
does not consider critically what to do in circumstances in which both the private and the 
public sector have failed to provide a solution to the crisis of the current prison system. 
This delineates the debate within the parameters of who should provide the prison, rather 
than whether the prison is a solution to the social issues that our societies face. This may 
make it easier to ignore and silence debate about the definitions and causes of criminal 
behaviour, such as social alienation, economic inequity and institutionalised discrimination. 
As accountability plays an important role in our ability to make decisions, the nature of the 





public to the private sector on the basis of cost, but rather it should enable an investigation 
into the purpose and possibilities of addressing the social issues that lead to crime and not 
just what we do with ‘the criminal’ afterwards.  
 
Private Prisons in Australia 
 
(A) private corporation is not in the business of being humanitarian. It’s in the 
business of increasing profit and market share. Doing that typically is extremely 
harmful to the general population. It may make some number look good 
(Chomsky, 1996, p. 122). 
 
Since 1988, the private sector has played an expanding role in the operation of Australia’s 
correctional facilities. This was sparked by the Kennedy Report (1988) for the Queensland 
Corrective Services Commission into correctional reform recommended that a private 
operator under contract to the Commission should develop one prison. This was based on 
its findings that problems within the existing system could be solved through privatisation, 
including staffing difficulties, creating a market for corrective institutions, increased 
flexibility in correctional arrangements, and developing competition in order to have 
something to test performance and costs against. This argument had been presented in other 
countries previously, and it is widely accepted within the literature on private prisons that 
the fundamental motivations of prison privatisation have been the belief that private prisons 
will reduce operating costs (largely through reduced labour costs), provide faster and 
cheaper prison capacity (limited barriers to financing and construction) and that they 
should improve the quality of the service (through innovation) (Logan, 1990; Calabrese, 
1993; Shichor, 1995). Although these arguments have been presented as neutral 
representations of the issues, the arguments are not sterile or politically neutral. Ideological 
assumptions underpinned the Kennedy Report, including the appeal to ‘the market’ to solve 
persistent failures within the prison sector; the representation of the unionised workforce as 
‘difficult’ and ‘problematic’, in part because of their refusal to accept further compromised 
work conditions; the appeal to ‘flexibility’ as though this will have no affect on quality or 
performance and that this flexibility does not come at a cost (such as people’s jobs or job 
security, working hours and so on); and the presumption that competition will enable 





back attempts to develop other ways of critiquing and improving punishment and prison 
services (Chan, 1994; Moyle, 1999).  
 
This would suggest that the decision to privatise prisons was not one based purely on 
technical information; rather, it was a highly politicised move surrounding a need to 
disassociate the government from the prevailing problems within prisons. Although these 
motivations were raised within the media and there was some public debate over the 
government’s approach, the report was accepted. This led the Commission to call for 
tenders to manage and operate Borallon Correctional Centre, which was a 240-bed medium 
security prison near Brisbane. Corrections Corporation Australia (CCA) was awarded this 
contract in 1989, and under this three-year contract, the first private prison in Australia was 
opened in 1991 at a cost of $22 million to build, and a contract fee of $9.7 million for the 
1991 financial year (Harding, 1992). This contract was awarded partly as a result of the 
lobbying efforts of Senior Executives from CCA who travelled around Australia in 1989 
‘informing’ State governments of the benefits of private prisons (Gow and Williamson, 
1998).  
 
Subsequently contracts have been awarded to private prison operators throughout the 
country and today Australia has 7 privately operated adult prisons operating in 5 states. 
These are run by three companies, all of which are foreign owned – Australian Integrated 
Management Services (a wholly owned subsidiary of the US company Sodexho Alliance), 
GEO Group (previously known as Australian Correctional Management), Management and 
Training Corporation (who’s corporate headquarters are in Utah) and GSL Custodial 
Services (formerly Group 4 Falck). Information about each of these prisons is presented in 
the following table 
 
[Table 1: Insert here] 
 
From the Kennedy Report onwards, the possibility that private companies could play a role 
in the provision of correctional institutions throughout Australia was firmly entrenched. 
Running a prison brings with it significant responsibilities. The foremost of these 
responsibilities is prisoner health, safety and dignity, all of which are prioritised under the 
Standard Guidelines for Corrections in Australia 1996 and the UN Standard Minimum 





dignified conditions for their inmates, which has meant that arguments suggesting that 
public prisons are more able to meet these qualitative outcomes than private prisons have 
been difficult to mount. However, there is significant evidence that suggests the pursuit of 
profit has exaggerated the erosion of the quality of services and conditions being provided 
to prisoners and the community as a whole. A study conducted by Biles and Dalton found 
that  
 
Port Phillip prison, Deer Park and Arthur Gorrie all have higher rates for all 
deaths and suicides than the Australian average (1999, p.4, see table). 
 
Although some of the findings of Biles and Dalton (1999) are alarming, the reports 
significance does not just lie in what it reveals about the performance of these prisons. Its 
significance also lies in what it reveals about the inability for a community to affect 
change, express outrage, demand greater scrutiny and ensure better outcomes for their 
community and the prison system as a whole. As prison institutions have struggled to 
maintain legitimacy as a form of punishment that has positive outcomes for the ‘punished’ 
and society in general, the introduction of the profit motive into this arena raises further 
concern (Cavise, 1998). Cavise has argued that 
 
(w)ith private control, there is a danger that prisoners, traditionally among 
society’s most neglected members, will suffer abuse and exploitation for profit 
(1998, p.22). 
 
It certainly makes the relationship between the community and the service provider one 
that is dependent on the community’s ability to monitor and access information about 
prisons. In the words of Harding: 
 
The question of effective accountability thus becomes central (Harding, 1992, 
p.2).  
 
Much of the literature concerning the debate over the contracting out of government 
services suggests that accountability can be ensured through a carefully constructed 
contract and appropriate monitoring arrangements (Harding, 1992; McDonald, 1994; 
Steane and Walker, 2000). This presents a very technical face of accountability, which is 





negotiations and is closely linked to a neoliberal framework (Bryan, 2000). Although there 
is a technical dimension to accountability this is often given a disproportionate 
representation within the literature and may have the affect of constructing rather than 
representing, notions of accountability “by rendering selectively visible, relations of 
accountability” (Power, 1991, p.38). Steane and Walker have argued that the dominant 
discourses in which this view of accountability is placed, “concerns the application of 
economic logic to issues previously within the domain of political scientists and public 
policy theorists” (2000, p.248; Chomsky, 1999). This is indicative of the systemic divorce 
of economic and social policy, as though one can be justified through the other, rather than 
equally important components of social organisation. 
 
At the least, the accountability process should reveal whether the contracted private 
operator is fulfilling its contract and providing the service that has been agreed upon, but 
according to Bates 
 
(a)fter 15 years of privatization, officials still have almost no reliable data to 
assess whether for profit prisons are doing their job – or living up to their promise 
to save taxpayers money (1999, p.22). 
 
In order to unravel some of the issues surrounding the public accountability of private 
prisons, the remainder of this paper will look at both its procedural and ethical 
manifestations discussed in an earlier section, illustrating how inadequate the current 
arrangements have been in achieving either. It should be noted that any attempt to deal with 
the procedural and the ethical dimensions of accountability separately presents problems. 
The failings of technical accountability enable discussion of the importance the ethical 
dimensions of accountability. Inevitably, these discussions are intertwined.   
 
Procedural Accountability and Prison Profits 
 
The term ‘accountability’ is used in this context to mean more a ‘technical’ than a 
‘moral’ responsibility and it is considered to be an objective and measurable 
concept rather than a subjective one (Shichor, 1998, p.90). 
 
Although it is increasingly accepted that accountability has a moral and ethical dimension 





English 2003), even its technical components are difficult to ensure. When applied to 
private prisons, ensuring even the most basic, commonplace forms of accountability has 
been problematic. There have been difficulties ensuring access to quality information; it 
has been hard to ensure financial accountability because of the ways that contract fees have 
been structured; it has been difficult to monitor contract performance; and the processes of 
contract awarding, renewal and termination have presented difficulties that undermine the 
ability of the community to ensure public accountability.  
 
I. Access to Quality Information 
 
If accountability is central to the concept of responsible government and 
knowledge of the activities of government is central to the exercise of a citizen’s 
control over government then it is clear that the doctrine of commercial 
confidentiality can operate as a barrier to the availability of information (Freiberg, 
1999, p. 121). 
 
For the procedural functions of accountability to be satisfied there must be access to 
information that facilitates necessary scrutiny. This is essential in order to ensure that social 
institutions are constantly under review and challenged to improve the quality of their 
services. Along with the important dimension of access is the need for quality information 
that gives detailed, accurate, comparable data – a mission that most accountants are fully 
aware of. Unfortunately, in the case of prison privatisation this access has been hindered by 
a number of things, namely, the government’s ability to deem certain information 
‘commercial in confidence’; the information has often been technical and hasn’t 
necessarily provided significant insight; often the information has not been reported in a 
timely manner; and some sources of information (such as prisoners) have been harder to 
access under privatisation.  
 
In Australia, many core documents relating to prison privatisation have been held back 
from public scrutiny under the guise of ‘commercial confidentiality’, stalling many 
attempts to scrutinise the operations of both state and private prisons because of a “lack of 
access to what seemed to be key documentation” (Harding, 1998, p.5; Funnell, 2003). This 
is a position supported by Gow and Williamson (1998) in there analysis of Australia’s 





which public access to information is secondary to a corporations desire for secrecy. 
Although some information about private prisons has been made available through 
Freedom of Information6 claims, this is costly, time consuming and often vital information 
is censored before release. The other main source of public information on privately 
managed prisons has been provided through audit reports of the prisons, and official 
investigations into prison operations such as the State Government of Victoria’s                            
Audit Review of Government Contracts (2000); the annual Productivity Commissions 
Report on Government Services; and specially commissioned reports such as the Victorian 
Correctional Service’s Report on the Metropolitan Women’s Correctional Centre’s 
Compliance with Contractual Obligations and Prison Services Agreement (Armytage, 
2000) and the Report of the Independent Investigation into the Management and 
Operations of Victoria’s Private Prisons (Kirby et al, 2000). Although these have value, 
they are limited and constrained by the framework in which they operate and often 
reinforce the current arrangements. The scopes of these investigations are often limited and 
most have focused on efficiency improvements, financial expenditures and performance 
against set measures. Appraisals that adopt a broader evaluative stance are not 
commonplace and are more likely the result of investigative journalism than any officially 
sanctioned system of accountability. 
 
A second issue that inhibits the ability to ensure effective accountability in this 
environment relates to the quality of that information. Information about the quality of the 
services has often been limited to that which is easily counted, such as the number of 
escape attempts, positive drug tests, or ‘incidents’. Audit reports and special reports 
commissioned by State Government’s into the activities of private prisons, like those 
mentioned previously, have also focused on these issues. These have considerable 
problems because of the ability to manipulate the data. It is also questionable whether this 
data can shed light on the quality of the service being provided, and whether it provides 
enough information on which to evaluate and review approaches to justice and punishment. 
Unfortunately, a strict liberal framework may “perpetuate the status quo by simply 
providing additional information to stakeholders without critically investigating” (Lehman, 
1999, p.218) the issues that are in question. It is here that this technical mutation of 






potentially constructing, by virtue of rendering selectively visible, relationship of 
accountability; an inversion of the traditional view of the sources of accountability 
(Power, 1991, p.39). 
 
The problems associated with access to information were highlighted in the Correctional 
Services Commissioner’s Report on the Metropolitan Women’s Correctional Centre’s 
(MWCC) (Armytage, 2000) compliance with its contractual obligations and prison services 
agreement. A lot of the issues raised here were not visible in the reports required under the 
contract and were only made apparent through detailed investigations and not through the 
standard accountability arrangements. By way of a specific example, the contract requires 
that the prison operator report drug related incidents to the Commissioner.  
 
The contract also required that no more than 8.26% of Prisoners test positive for non-
prescribed drug use, as a result of random testing (Contract for the Management of 
Metropolitan Women’s Correctional Centre, 1995, p. 171). This accounted for 20% of the 
Corrections Corporation Australia’s (CCA) performance related fee (Armytage, 2000). 
Should this target be breached then the fee would be reduced by the proportion established 
within the contract. Ideally, the emphasis placed on these kinds of performance outcomes 
should improve the performance of the service. However, the emphasis can also mean that 
steps are taken to ensure that the outcomes are met ‘technically’ without actually 
improving performance. For instance, the Commissioner’s investigation into the MWCC 
found that 
 
for the last 3 months, prisoner ‘E’ has been tested on 13 occasions between 
4.00am and 5.20am. The MWCC Manager Health Services has advised OCSC 
there is no medical reason as to why prisoner ‘E’ has to be tested at these times. 
The testing of prisoner ‘E’ at these times is of significant concern as the 
predictability of testing enables the prisoner to use drugs with a decreased 
likelihood of being detected (Armytage, 2000, p.16). 
 
This is an example of how the measurement criteria can be manipulated in order to meet 
contractual requirements. Such distortions of ‘success’ are inevitable when the criteria for 
measurement are as limited as the number of positive drug tests, and that these criteria are 
contingent on the continuity of the contract and the financial viability of the private 





related to the management decision not to report required information in a timely manner. 
As any meaningful system of accountability requires the exchange of information, these 
breaches undermine the ability of the government to ensure the private contractor is held 
accountable and also undermines the ability of the public to hold the government 
accountable for its actions. The Auditor General of Victoria’s Report on Ministerial 
Portfolio’s (2001) identified a number of key issues that related to Victoria’s private 
prisons operators failing to report information. They found that significant incidents were 
not “immediately reported” (2001, s3.4.39) and many incidents were “not declared at the 
earliest opportunity” (2001, s.3.4.40), undermining the most basic dimension of 
accountability.  
 
Although some audit reports and special investigations into private prisons have provided 
insight into the management of the private prisons, this has been limited by a number of 
factors that are unique to the new private arrangements. For instance, traditionally, 
prisoners have been a good source of information about what is actually occurring within a 
prison and their access to people outside the prison has played an important accountability 
function (Maguire et al, 1985). According to Gow and Williamson (1998), in Victoria 
private prison regulation has ensured the censoring and silencing of prisoners, wherein 
prisoners have to pre-record eight phone numbers, calling the media is banned and all 
phone calls are recorded. This has meant that there has been a decrease in the amount of 
information about what happens inside prisons from the point of view of the actual 
prisoners. The report into MWCC (Armytage, 2000) found similar problems, with 
inadequate staffing leading to long lock-down periods, which make it impossible for 
prisoners to access telephones or meet with family and friends. This draws into question 
the argument that more flexible staffing arrangements made possible through private prison 
operators are actually lead to more successful prisons. 
 
In order for basic accountability this to be satisfied access to information needs to be 
ensured, and in a profit-oriented environment, this may be even harder to guarantee. Rather 
than ensuring that private contractors perform well, these examples suggest that there is a 
large incentive to ensure that the private contractor appears to be performing well. As 
Shichor has argued, evaluating private prison performance is hard because “of the paucity 
of benchmark data to forecast future developments”, the “problems of access to the records 





when “there is already an assumption that they are doing a better job than state run prisons” 
(1998, p. 89). There is significant evidence to suggest that private prison operators are not 
providing the government with even the most basic, contractually required information 
within the defined time frames. As such, access to quality information that enables scrutiny 
of private prisons by the government becomes very difficult and just as importantly, the 
lack of publicly available information makes it almost impossible for member of the 
broader community to scrutinise the activities of the prison operators. A corresponding 
problem arises, in that the energies of the interested parties become focused narrowly on 
achieving basic information exchanges, and questions about what constitutes that 
information, and who has a right to it become marginalised by the pressing need to ensure 
the basic requirements (as defined by the contract) are met. In light of this, even this 
procedural element of the accountability arrangements between the prison contractor and 
the government has been hard to ensure. 
 
II. Contractual Fees: How to Make a Profit, Prison Style 
 
What has happened is the privatisation of profit and the socialisation of risk (Scott, 
1996, p.101) 
 
As a result of the commercial confidentiality powers of governments, very little contract 
information has been released. By mid 2004, contracts for private prisons in Victoria and 
Western Australian were publicly available, however, all other states have not released the 
contracts to the public. Importantly, the financial information within these contracts has not 
been made publicly available, so public scrutiny of the financial arrangements has only 
been possible through secondary sources. 
 
Fees awarded for private prison management contracts differ from state to state and prison 
to prison. There are obvious reasons for the differences in payment, including the different 
mix of inmates in the prison, the different level of services provided, or the agreed 
differences in efficiency, running costs and profit margins for the operators. When 
analysing these costs, the Auditor-General (1999) could not release the benchmarks for 
government operating costs, but could say that all contracts were less than the 
government’s benchmarks and that even so, he was unsure about the cost savings because 





cost ‘realities’. In terms of accountability, the contracts provide little information about 
how much the fee will be reduced in the case of breaches, which is essential in order to 
understand how the firm is encouraged financially to comply with the contract. There is 
also little information about how the corporation can make a profit and what actions they 
can take in order to pursue this aim.  
 
Generally the fees associated with a prison contract have been divided into three parts. 
There is an accommodation service charge, which is for the provision of physical facilities; 
a correctional services fee, which is for the day-to-day operations of the prison; and a 
performance-linked fee, representing the investment reward or profit. It is the latter that 
distinguishes the private operator from the government. It is a fee that should encourage 
quality service delivery because it enables the operator to make a profit. However, this fee 
has often led to an erosion of reporting quality rather than an increase in service.  The 
following section will offer some examples of how this fee structure has not enhanced the 
accountability framework, financially or in terms of service quality.  
 
Firstly, the accommodation service charge appears to be a simple fee for service payment, 
but has proven to be quite controversial. For example, the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission (Mares, 2000) reported that charities may have inadvertently contributed to 
ACM’s bottom line. ACM’s contract requires it to ensure that there is adequate clothing for 
the detainees and prisoners, but it puts no limits on how they can source and finance these 
needs. According to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s report, ACM initially 
sourced clothes from St Vincent de Paul, who agreed to provide them at $5 per kilogram 
(their normal rate was $8). Eventually it was discovered that ACM managed to source the 
clothes from another section of St Vincent de Paul for free. When ACM was confronted by 
St Vincent de Paul, they ended up paying $2,100 for 2,000 kilograms of clothes for which 
they originally had negotiated a rate of $5 per kilogram. When this information came to 
light, the commercial relations between St Vincent de Paul and ACM broke down, so ACM 
went to the Uniting Church and asked for clothes and basic housing items to be provided 
(such as curtains). According to the Uniting Church, there was no suggestion that they 
would pay for these items. When the Uniting Church realised that “the government is 
actually, on behalf of the Australian people, paying ACM to provide those things and we 
decided then not to go ahead with it” (Mares, 22/11/2000).  The situation exposed the fact 





provided the service. The outcome proved controversial as it allowed the private operator 
the opportunity to exploit charitable organisations to fulfil its contractual requirements in 
an attempt to maximise its profits. In this situation the use of private operators and the 
claims that these operators can provide the services more cost effectively, has meant the 
provider under the private system can be held less accountable than a government provider.  
 
Secondly, the correctional services fee also appeared to be a straightforward payment, but 
instead, it has proven quite controversial. For example, in January 2003, prison guards at 
Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre were in dispute with ACM over a plan to use prison 
labour to increase prison profits (Private Prison Report International, May 2003). The 
proposal involved replacing prison staff with inmates in areas such as the kitchen. 
Although ACM was paid a fee to provide for the day-to-day management of the centre, this 
proposal didn’t appear to contravene the contract as the contract had not defined how the 
services should be provided. After protracted negotiations with unions, the proposal was 
dropped. This presented a similar dilemma to that outlined previously, the mode of delivery 
was left out of the contract to enable ‘flexibility’ but instead could be interpreted as 
allowing the company access to exploitative practices to maximise returns. There was no 
formal process that allowed the government and the community to hold the provider 
accountable for how the service was to be delivered.  
 
And finally, the performance linked fee was designed to enable the company to be paid a 
fee that was above the costs of the operation based on them meeting certain specified 
standards. Unfortunately, the performance incentive has often led to under reporting of 
incidents, rather than excellence in service quality. For example the Woomera detention 
centre provides graphic examples of the extent that corrections corporations will go to in 
order to be ‘cost effective’ and ultimately generate a profit. In the case of Woomera, it 
appeared that Australasian Correctional Management (ACM) failed to report ‘incidents’ 
that related to its performance evaluation. Such an incident received considerable media 
attention when it was reported in 2000 that ACM failed to report an alleged rape of a 12-
year-old boy in their Woomera facility. It was also widely reported that they were reluctant 







This would suggest that the presence of a financial penalty and the corresponding effect 
this would have on the profitability of the centre, meant that the accountability 
arrangements written into the contract weren’t sufficient and may well have led to 
opposing outcomes. For ACM to be held accountable if they breach their responsibilities to 
care for refugees and keep them free from physical and sexual abuse, the government relies 
on them to report incidents accurately. Conversely, to ensure a profit, the company has an 
interest in ensuring reports do not expose them to a financial penalty. 
 
Detailed information is important in order to understand how the profit motive is affecting 
the provision of prison services and how ‘cost effectiveness’ is actually achieved. Without 
this type of information financial accountability becomes emasculated and technical, 
lacking any substantial information on which to assess performance. As few contracts are 
available, and the costing remains secret in many cases, it forces the public to rely on 
secondary sources. It becomes hard to scrutinise costs, let alone form a picture as to 
whether the cost savings (if there are any) are morally defensible or are the result of 
practices that are unacceptable to the community. 
 
III. Contractual Monitoring 
 
Richard Harding: To give an example, in Junee Prison, which is in New South 
Wales, there was at one stage a riot, and this riot wasn’t even mentioned in the 
annual report of the monitors about the prison. It was quite a major riot, and 
obviously they didn’t quite conceive, or their superiors did not quite conceive 
their role as dealing with the feel of what’s happening in the prison, the ethos, 
they were more concerned with tick-a-box kind of monitoring (Haultain, 1997). 
 
From a purely technical point of view, the contract with the private prison needs to ensure 
access for official visitors, Ombudsmen’s right to oversee the operations, parliamentary 
scrutiny and freedom of information. Notably, these things would be almost identical to the 
monitoring rights of the community if the facilities were being managed by the public 
sector, but in addition to these the contracts must ensure that an independent monitor is 
appointed to check contract compliance and compliance with general standards. In order to 
perform a monitoring task, the contracts that are being monitored need to be available, 
however in many cases the “final contracts themselves are treated as being ‘commercial in 





sector secrecy and a protracted legal battles using Freedom of Information legislation has 
led the Western Australian and Victorian government to make available private prison 
contracts to the public. Although this kind of openness is an essential part of accountability, 
it is not enough in itself.  
 
Monitoring the contract is essential to ensure that the service that has been defined and paid 
for is actually being provided. Harding (1998) suggested that the monitoring of contracts 
under the stated arrangements and within the organisational cultural contexts provides a 
situation that is open to regulatory capture. This sections opening statement by Richard 
Harding (Haultain, 1997) on the Junee Prison riots provides an example of regulatory 
failure, as the Correction Service Commission of New South Wales had not persisted with 
the on-site full-time monitor provided for in the contract. Instead they had withdrawn that 
person from the system, leaving Junee prison without a person equipped to monitor the 
operations properly. There are a number of examples of this ‘capture’ within contractual 
arrangements. One such example is the Borallon prison in Queensland, which was 
supposed to have a monitor on site five days per week. This person was directly 
responsible to the Queensland Corrective Services Commission (QCSC). When 
interviewed a year after the opening of the prison, the monitor was spending one day per 
week at the site as the person had become responsible for the monitoring of five sites 
(Moyle, 1994). Harding (1998) suggested that this process was the result of resource 
constraints and neither a corporate or government organisational culture that was 
supportive of the need for monitoring, making it difficult for the monitor to access the 
information and resources to fulfil the obligations of the role. In this way, the contracting 
out decision may service the needs of both the private operator and the government, as 
neither have had to maintain the monitoring standard required previously – and both have 
been able to blame each other for the inadequacies. 
 
Although the accountability mechanisms may appear sound within the contract, the 
practicalities are never as clearly represented (Funnell, 2001). This is a point that has been 
clearly made by Cavise, when he argued that 
 
(i)f the interests of society and the rights of the individual are to be safeguarded, 
the "government of the people" is under an obligation to ensure that the goals of 





agency that is not motivated by profit but by societal and individual concerns 
(1998, p.20). 
 
It has been suggested that if the contract is sound, it can provide strict safeguards in terms 
of specification of standards, default, penalty, termination and step-in clauses. According to 
Harding, “(a) loose contract will tend to have loose accountability; a tighter one should 
facilitate accountability” (1998, p.80). However, as the Borallon and Junee example 
suggest, contracted and actual accountability may be significantly different. All this may 
enable us to forget that we are talking about accountability in and for prisons, which has a 
moral and social responsibility beyond the technical (in)accuracies of a contract. As 
Shearer has argued “any theory of moral responsibility must ultimately rest on ethical 
considerations regarding the nature of the economic entity, including its relationship to the 
human community within which it operates” (Shearer, 2002, p.543). 
 
IV. Contract Awarding, Renewal and Termination 
 
The process of awarding, renewing and terminating contracts must enable the government 
to hold the contractor accountable for their actions and also should allow the community to 
have input as to the acceptability of the contractual arrangement (Scott, 1996; Schoombee, 
1997). Unfortunately, this has proven difficult in Australia as the tendering and renewal 
process has not encouraged the kind of competition that is supposed to lead to better 
outcomes. This is particularly true in the case of contract renewal, wherein many of the 
contracts allow the current operating company the right to the contract over other operators 
in the industry. 
 
There are a variety of possible contractual arrangements between government and the 
private contractor, from purely outsourcing the administration of prisons, to contracting out 
design and construction of the prisons, to full ownership and financing of the complete 
prison arrangement. There have been considerable investigations into the mixture that is 
the most cost effective, whilst maintaining the minimum quality required (Logan, 1990). 
According to Harding (1998) there has been considerable take up of the model that ensures 
private contractors, or their financiers, have paid for and own the prison structure itself, 
with the government repaying the capital and borrowing costs over time.  At the expiry of 





lease of the land. These contracts also come with initial five-year management contracts 
with three-year renewal periods. This arrangement has been adopted heavily in Victoria, 
leading Harding to question how accountability can be maintained within these contractual 
arrangements as it “gives the owner/operator a powerful position in bidding for the 
continuance of the initial contract” (1998, p. 2). As the “loss of a management contract to a 
competitor” is an “important element in effective accountability” this is “unlikely” 
(Harding, 1998, p.2). Currently in Australia, Borallon, Arthur Gorrie and Mt Gambier are 
‘management only’ contracts; Woodford and Junee are ‘design, construct and 
management’ contracts; with Victoria’s Deer Park, Fulham and Port Phillip being the only 
fully privatised prisons.  
 
The private ownership of prison buildings and land may present a serious issue to 
governments if they choose to take back the administration of prison services. As the 
ability to reclaim the administration of the prison is an integral part of the accountability 
process, these ownership and control issues could erode the ‘actual’ existence of 
appropriate accountability mechanisms. Harding has argued that  
 
(d)eferred ownership of real estate and physical plant and long-term financial 
commitment by way of certificates of participation together constitute real if not 
insuperable barriers to state policy reversal in this area (1997, p.13). 
 
There are many examples of State governments failing to step in when companies have 
breached their contracts. For instance, the Prison Privatisation Report International (PPRI) 
reported in May 2003, that the Inspector General of Corrective Services for NSW 
commented on ACM’s management of the Junee Correctional Centre, stating that “there 
appear to be a number of ongoing areas where the contractor and the department (of 
corrective services) have disagreed in terms of service delivery, but these matters never 
seem to be resolved. Nevertheless the department continues to find the contractor 
satisfactorily meets its contractual obligations” (PPRI, May 2003). 
 
During a lockdown in Port Phillip prison operated by Group 4 in May 2003, a pistol, 
ammunition, drugs, mobile phones and a digital camera were found in prison cells. As the 
government did not step in, there was considerable community concern surrounding the 





prison operators” (PPRI, June 2003). PPRI drew attention to an interview with Andre 
Haermeyer on ABC Radio in which he said “we have contractual obligations and it is only 
when there is a serious and repeated material default against the contract that we can 
actually step in” and when asked whether a loaded gun constituted such a breach he replied 
“well, no, it isn’t, under the contract, no…” (PPRI, June 2003). In fact, the contracts for 
this prison and Fulham (run by Group 4) was renewed in October 2002 with what the 
government described as ‘tighter performance measures’, however, this was not part of a 
competitive retendering process because the initial contract gave these operators first rights 
to new contracts. 
 
The difficulties faced by governments when they decide to reverse the decision to privatise 
or contract out has been evidenced in the case of the Metropolitan Women’s Correctional 
Centre in Victoria, where the government has faced community concern about the cost of 
the reversal. Even though the situation at the MWCC was revealed to be in breach of the 
contract, the decision to terminate the contract was not easy. With the return of MWCC to 
public control in 2000, this situation arose after 4 years of repeated breaches of contract 
and failure to meet the service delivery outcomes required.  
  
However, there was little precedence for such a situation and the conditions of that return 
were complicated and negotiations were protracted. In the end, the state of Victoria was 
forced to purchase the building from the contractor. Acknowledging the breaches the 
contractor requested a negotiated settlement of the contractual arrangements, which meant 
that the state of Victoria was not exposed to extended litigation. In November 2000, the 
Government took back ownership and management of the prison for $20.2 million, $17.8 
million of which was for the building, infrastructure and chattels and $2.4 covered the costs 
of terminating the loan on the facility that had been taken out by the private operator 
(Auditor General – Victoria, 2001). The Auditor General – Victoria (2001) identified that 
$1.2 million of these costs were specifically related to the step-in and administration of the 
facility.  
 
These indicate the costs that are not considered when a contracting out or privatisation 
decision is made and is indicative of the ideologically driven cost data that is produced in 
order to justify privatisation decisions. As a result of the complexities of the contracting 





actions. As Robinson (2003, p.184) pointed out “reports generated through performance 
measurement initiatives were supposed to give the voting public a way to see how 
responsible and accountable their government had become. But the presence of such 
unintended consequences might inspire us to consider the following idea: scientific 
knowledge can be used as a weapon”. Perhaps an extension of this would be to say that in 
light of neoliberal ideology, these consequences may benefit both the government and the 
private prison operator as they produce the appearance of accountability whilst distorting 
its meaning in fundamental ways that enable a retreat from responsibility (Funnell, 2001).  
 
 
Ethical Accountability and Prison Profits 
 
Frank Vincent: The State creates the offences, imposes the sanctions, enforced the 
law, and then either incarcerates individuals or subjects them to community-based 
orders of one kind or another. The whole process is an activity of the State, and for 
the purposes of the State, and it makes no sense then that the State would not be 
central to it. It must be realised that at the end of the day that what is being exercised 
is a considerable amount of power in relation to individuals (Haultain, 1997). 
  
In the previous section it has been established that even a procedural view of accountability 
is difficult to ensure, but even if it was easy, it is still insufficient as it fails to ground our 
ideas of accountability within a “substantive moral framework” (Lehman, 2005, p.976). As 
Lehman (2005, p.985) has argued “(i)t remains problematic whether procedural 
conceptions of accountability expand our understanding of citizenship” instead, it is 
possible that “people the atoms that make a market system work”.  
 
Along with this, it is important to acknowledge that accountability within the prison sector 
has important ethical dimensions, the removal of a persons right to participate in society is 
a significant State power and public support because of its moral intent. This intent can’t be 
discharged by a ‘check the box’ style accountability arrangement, as the State, the 
community, the ‘prison provider’ and the ‘criminals’ moral responsibility is more 
substantive than immediate, measurable outcomes would lead us to believe. In this section, 
two issues will be explored in order to illustrate the centrality of ethics, when discussing 
public accountability for prisons. Firstly, the quasi-judicial powers of prisons mean that 





person may endure; and secondly, there are considerable socio-political and ethical 
questions surrounding the future of a society that sanctions a connection between profit and 
punishment. As Shichor argued “instrumental goals are usually clear, consistent and easily 
quantifiable, on the other hand, the goals of human service organisations are harder to 
quantify, their level of performance does not lend itself to easy evaluation” (1998, p.89). 
 
I. The Quasi-Judicial Powers of Prisons 
 
When addressing issues of moral responsibility and prison management, the outsourcing of 
prisons has been justified on claims that the sentence and the administration of that 
sentence can be clearly separated (Harding, 1992). However there are a number of 
problems with this, particularly in regard to ‘quasi-legal’ decisions that are made within 
prisons themselves. These are made with little outside arbitration or scrutiny and in some 
cases there is no outside arbitration at all. This means that prison management does have 
the ability to affect the way that the sentence is administered, and has some ability to 
significantly change the experience of that sentence as a result of internal decisions, 
particularly in the case of alleged breaches of prison discipline. In these cases, the hearing 
and review process often occurs entirely within a correctional centre (Moyle, 1999), 
drawing into question the ability for private sector management to make credible, 
uninterested decisions, about the treatment of prisoners. Moyle (1994) attended a number 
of hearings at Borallon and Lotus Glen in Queensland, and some of the transcripts illustrate 
the lack of scrutiny within internal hearings. He outlined the position of Manager of 
Operations (MO) at the Borallon prison saying  
 
it was acceptable to breach inmates because they were a “problem at the centre”. 
The MO clarified the meaning of “problem at the centre” as “protecting CCA’s 
business name” (Moyle, 1999, p.166). 
 
This is not an isolated incident. In Queensland, the private company ACM runs the 
reception centre at Arthur Gorrie. At this facility, all the decisions about the prisoner’s 
classification as a maximum/medium/minimum security inmate are made. It goes without 
saying that these will seriously affect the movement of a prisoner through the correctional 





in practice, extensive discretion to be exercised on behalf of the classification staff. When 
Moyle interviewed a sentence classification officer at ACM in 1997, they gave an example: 
 
“Here is an inmate who is a serious sex offender. We have to look at presentation, 
appearance, behaviour, mood, what he is thinking and his employment history. 
We should get a psychologist to do this but because of a shortage we have a 
teacher doing it. I shouldn’t tell you that. The recommendation should not be 
made by a teacher…We know it’s not their place” (Moyle, 1999, p. 169). 
 
This decision making process has serious consequences for the person about to enter the 
correctional system as it will affect the ‘type’ of sentence they will have to undergo. 
Moyle’s (1999) paper argued that the fact that a private facility was able to make these 
decisions meant that they might have the opportunity to choose ‘profitable’ or ‘cheap’ 
prisoners (Harding, 1998 also outlines this possibility). Private management can also 
exercise quasi-judicial powers by placing a prisoner in solitary confinement, which is a 
practice that amounts to punishment and it does not have to be sanctioned directly by the 
State. At the Acacia prison in Western Australia, AIMS corporation came under criticism 
from the Inspector General, Richard Harding when he discovered that there was evidence 
that “some inmates had been locked in their cell, with the electricity off as a form of 
punishment” (PPRI, May 2003). 
 
According to Moyle, these internal “disciplinary regimes involve an extension of state 
authority” (1999, p. 172). Russell voiced concern over these arrangements when he wrote 
 
(p)rivate prisons can directly affect remission, parole, disciplinary decisions and a 
number of other issues which potentially increase the length of sentence of an 
inmate and some these matters are not subject to review or appeal (1997, p.8). 
 
The fact that private companies, primarily answerable to their shareholders, can make 
decisions about prisoners that go beyond administration, undermines the government’s 
argument that a prison sentence can be managed by a private entity. It is obvious that the 
quasi judicial powers of prison management impinge on the government’s ultimate 
responsibility to determine the punishment of the person. It also complicates the public 





the punishment is being carried out. The affect of profiting from punishment on public 
accountability will be considered in the following section. 
 
II. Profiting From Punishment 
 
As punishment is complex social, ideological and cultural terrain, it will never be an 
entirely rational execution of orders with clear objectives and controllable outcomes. It is 
has multiple and competing aims and innumerable intended and unintended consequences. 
In accordance with this Garland has argued “(t)he failure of modern punishment is in part 
the inevitable outcome of an over rationalized conception of its functions” (1991, p.12). As 
prisons enable a society to separate and classify those that it deems to be ‘criminal’, the 
introduction of privately operated prisons further separates criminals from society because 
of the shifts this enables in terms of public accountability. In light of this, the ability for a 
private corporation to profit from nuanced state and social objectives acted out on the body 
of a citizen could be considered unreasonable and morally repugnant. By no means is it 
surprising that corporations will act to minimise costs, and cost is an obvious consideration 
in the delivery of any public sector function but the centrality of cost and the possibility of 
profit are problematic. Prisons and penal policy should be focused on broader social 
objectives and questions that lead to better outcomes for all members of a society, 
including prisoners, as has been shown, these questions are not enabled within the current 
accountability arrangements. This is a view supported by Shearer (2002, p.546) who 
argued that “when economic entities render accounts of themselves in economic terms, the 
identity so portrayed and the obligations of the entity with respect to the broader 
community are both dependent upon the specific conceptions of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity that are instantiated by economic discourse” 
 
It has been argued throughout this paper that imprisonment has an undeniable moral 
component, as punishment imposes deprivation and suffering on a citizen as a result of 
them breaking the law. According to Ryan and Ward, it should be remembered that 
punishment represents “organized use of force in liberal democratic states” (1989, p. 70) 
which means there is a huge scope for abuse in this process by both private and public 
agencies. They argued that it is morally repugnant to punish people for profit because it 
creates a link between pain and suffering, and profits. For them it is not punishment that is 





entrepreneurs” (1989, p.70). It is also possible that these rewards may create a prison 
industrial complex, in which there is a vested interest in prison expansion (Stern, 1998). 
This would suggest that there are profound ethical and ideological issues surrounding the 
privatisation of prisons, yet these have been ignored largely in favour of discussions 
regarding cost-effectiveness, comparative costs and value for money – all strong indicators 
of a government driven by neoliberal ideology (both Logan, 1990 and Calabrese, 1993 
discuss this in detail). It is difficult to accept the argument that problems associated with 
the private/public sector split of responsibilities can be overcome with effective 
accountability, because the accountability proposed is highly technical, rational and 
objective, disconnected from the moral and ethical dimensions present within 
accountability relationship. As has been argued by Freiberg 
 
(t)he provision of correctional services carries with it greater responsibilities and 
unusual requirements of accountability than most other areas of government 
services. Because prisons are concerned with the liberty of individuals, issues of 
authority, legitimacy, procedural justice, liability and corruptibility must play a 
major role in their management (1999, p.122). 
 
Questions about the quality and purpose of corrections services must be central to the 
debate, which has led Russell to argue that   
 
private prisons should be opposed fundamentally because of the inferior quality of 
services prisoners receive as a result of the insatiable drive to increase the profit 
margin in such institutions (1997, p.7). 
 
As has been suggested, the boundaries between the allocation and administration of 
punishment are also complicated within a private prison system as the prison operator does 
have many discretionary powers that can affect the length and type of incarceration that the 
prisoner experiences (Ryan and Ward, 1989; Moyle, 1999). This is also true of public 
prisons, but when a corporation who is ultimately bound by corporation law to maximise 
returns to shareholders is responsible for such decision making, keeping prison beds filled 
and the industry growing is essential to the growth potential of the company. This may lead 
to a situation in which “doing well beats doing good” (Smith, 1993) in the corrections 
industry. There is substantial evidence of this within the industry, for instance the Inspector 





discovered that “quantities of food seemed to have diminished as population increased, as 
if the same sized cake were being divided more times” (PPRI, May 2003).  
 
This is a view supported by Hallet who claimed that combining privatising aspects of the 
corrections system has enabled a solution to over-crowded and costly prisons that leaves 
the root cause of crime unaddressed, and “in this case, the fountain of all profits – large 
populations of disenfranchised surplus population trapped in the inner city to be 
incarcerated for non-violent drug crime – conveniently intact” (2002, p. 389). Instead of 
communities demanding a form of accountability that highlights their elected officials 
efforts to address root causes of crime, and information about a government’s efforts to 
reduce behaviour that is deemed to be socially inappropriate, we are left with accounts of 
how governments are reducing the costs of crime through privatisation. This is obviously in 
the interests of those that profit from imprisonment, because if we were to begin to address 
root causes, it is imaginable that the number of people going to jail would decrease and this 
would have a corresponding negative impact on shareholder wealth of private corrections 
companies. Overall, connecting profits to punishment means that there will be less 
incentive to reduce rates of incarceration and enormous private resources will be mobilised 
to ensure that prison policy does not deviate from a policy that continues to enrich private 
interests (Chomsky, 1999).  For Shichor even the potential “for conflict between the social 
interests to reduce prison population, and the financial interests of private correctional 
corporations to increase it” (1998, p.84) is too much and he argued that 
 
(t)he logic and nature of corporations further the consistent drive toward expansion 





The dominance of neo-liberal ideology in post-industrial societies has meant that the prison 
has not been left untouched by decision-making models founded on ‘economic 
rationalism’. Chomsky (1999) has argued that this is part of a systematic effort to erode 
democracy, which in his view benefits corporations and governments. Both are able to 
distance themselves from the will of the people and act in ways that are mutually beneficial 





have to respond to. The privatisation of prison management and prison building connects 
punishment with profit, and although many argue that the sentence and the administration 
of that sentence can be separated, this paper indicates that there are significant areas of 
overlap. The expeditions of private capital into areas that have been off limits are indicative 
of the crises that face the expansionist imperative of capitalism in economies that are no 
longer industrially oriented. As capital looks for places to grow, public sector services are a 
logical focus and prisons have not been left out of this process. Within the context of 
private prison operations, effective accountability plays a vital role in order to provide the 
conditions that enable the private provider, the state and citizens to scrutinise penal policy 
and operations. Unfortunately, as this paper has shown, the technical mutations of 
accountability have dominated these processes and it has also been argued that the 
emphasis placed on procedural accountability has helped obfuscate the ethical and moral 
components of accountability relationships. 
  
The idea that profits can be derived from punishment presents our society with a 
considerable ethical dilemma, and those opposed to such a relationship have often couched 
this opposition in terms of the superiority of the state over the private sector. The difficulty 
with this argument is that public prison systems are also riddled with problems, and a 
debate that centres on the provider can fail to analyse the role of prisons and punishment 
within society. Raising ethical accountability issues creates a level of complexity that can 
be confusing and messy, but such issues can lead to deeper considerations of the inequities 
that operate within our societies and the impact these have on criminality; the prejudices 
that are institutionalised and the affect this has on the ways we define deviance and 
illegality; the alienation experienced within post-industrial society and the corresponding 
need to act out; and the ways that power operates to define the parameters of the acceptable 
and unacceptable. It is in this way that punishment is both a social expression and an 
instrument of social control, wherein discussions about the role of the state in sentence 
administration can be a distraction from the deeper issues of economic, political and social 
influence. Unfortunately, the technical mutations of accountability appear to have provided 
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Table1: Private Prisons in Australia, 2003.  
(Data provided by the Australian Institute for Criminology) 
 
State Name Security Level Size Private Operator 
Western Australia Acacia Medium(Male) 750 AIMS 
Queensland Arthur Gorrie Max/Med/Min 
(reception and remand) 
710 ACM 
Queensland Borallon Max/Med 492 MTC 
Victoria Fulham Med/Min 777 ACM (GEO Group 
Australia) 
Victoria Port Phillip Max 710 Group 4 (GSL 
Custodial Services) 
NSW Junee Med/Min 600 ACM 
South Australia Mt Gambier Med/Min 110 Group 4 










                                                 
1 Although it may appear that I accept the idea of the ‘criminal’ unproblematically, this is not the case. 
Criminality and its connection to race, socio-economic opportunity and gender are acknowledged, but cannot 
be explored in detail within this paper. 
2 There is considerable historical debate about the role of private contractors in the penal system, with the 
period between 1840 and 1960 providing many examples of private contractors involved in a variety of 
correctional activities (Garland, 1990). Although this is true, ‘public sector’ services dominated the period. It 
should also be noted that the shift to public management of prisons has not necessarily led to the outcomes 
mentioned here. 
3 This is the highest in the world on a percentage basis (Roth, 2004). 
4 Funnell (2001) outlines an example in the United States where attempts to specify the requirements of a loaf 
of bread led to the production of a 20 page document. 
5 However, according to Chomsky (1999) it is “not new” and it is “not liberal”. 
6 Under the Freedom of Information Act, you may be denied right of access to information where, there is a 
legitimate need for confidentiality or where another person's privacy may be invaded. Under the legislation 
the business affairs of another person or business are often exempt from claims under the Act. 
